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Abstract
On BHPS data we measure various indices of social capital at the individual and
household level, and use them as explanatory variables in standard consumption in-
surance tests. We find that two out of three aspects of social capital positively impact
on consumption smoothing, by reducing the sensitivity of idiosyncratic consumption
to idiosyncratic income, both in the long and in the short run. Such effects, however,
turn out to be more pronounced in the long run. Further confirmation of the posi-
tive impact of social capital on insurance opportunities are derived from an income
smoothing exercise, as well as from a Poisson and a Logit analysis on the occurrence
of unemployment spells.
Keywords: consumption insurance; social capital; income volatility; item response
theory.
JEL codes: A14; C33; D12; D80
1 Introduction
The object of this work is to provide an empirical investigation over the role played by
several forms of social capital (social networks, civic participation and neighborhood at-
tachment) in terms of consumption insurance, income volatility and vulnerability to the risk
of unemployment. The econometric analysis is based on a sample of households and indi-
viduals selected from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, hereafter) over the time
horizon 1996-2006. First, we evaluate the degree of consumption insurance among U.K.
households applying a standard consumption insurance test regression a` la Mace (1991).
Secondly, the traditional analysis is extended to account for the impact of private social
capital onto households’ insurance capabilities. Personal contacts, geographic proximity
and information flows foster agents’ insurance against shocks to income (Cochrane (1991);
Townsend (1994); Sørensen and Yosha (2000)). This idea, first outlined by Cochrane
(1991), was empirically tested for a number of developing countries (e.g. Townsend (1994);
De Weerdt and Dercon (2006); Fafchamps and Lund (2003)) and recently theoretically
embedded within the social network analysis (e.g., Bramoulle` and Kranton (2007); Am-
brus et al. (2010)). However, the empirical contributions cited above concentrated on the
existence and effectiveness of risk sharing mechanisms in network contexts, or on the de-
terminants of the formation of such networks. Surprisingly few contributions have dealt
with the impact of social capital accumulation on the extent of risk sharing. To the best
of our knowledge, only Feigenberg et al. (2010) deal with this topic, and show that, in the
context of microfinance, increases in social interaction are associated with improvements
in informal risk-sharing. Thus, we intend to contribute to this stream of literature by
assessing the effect of several different forms of social capital onto risk sharing; impor-
tantly, we do so in the context of an industrialized country where, contrary to the case
of developing countries, formal and informal insurance mechanisms coexist. To evaluate
the impact exerted by social networks, civic participation and neighborhood attachment
onto households’ consumption smoothing patterns, we exploit the empirical strategy due
to Melitz and Zumer (1999)1, largely applied for risk sharing analysis among countries,
which consists in interacting several proxies for household’s social capital with standard
test regressors. Moreover, we will also allow for an asymmetric response of consumption to
income shocks following the empirical approach proposed in Pierucci and Ventura (2010).
As a further step in the analysis, we investigate the effects of social capital over individ-
uals’ income volatility; finally, we evaluate the effects of social capital on the probability
of experiencing unemployments spells, by implementing a poisson and a probit regression
analyses. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 and 3 present data, theory and
empirical strategy; the results and the main findings are reported in section 4, section 5
concludes. A Data Appendix gives details on variables.
2 Data
We considered eleven waves of the BHPS (from year 1996 to 2006).2 The sample has
been restricted to include those households interviewed in all the waves considered, char-
acterized by a stable structure and always reporting income, food consumption and other
1Further applied and extended by several other contributions such as, among many others, ?, Balli
et al. (2011).
2The sample period was cut well before the crisis period in order to avoid any possible influence of the
world crisis of years 2008-2009 on income and consumption.
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expenditures for non durables such as the amount spent on gas, oil, electricity and coal.3
These selections generated a panel of 1,083 households for a total of 11,913 observations,
which shrinks to 10,830 when we employ the difference of some variables. Data at the
household level are used for consumption insurance tests reported in tables 3 and 4. The
three item response models (see section 3 and Data Appendix for details on models and
data) were estimated with data taken only from the wave (M) of year 2002, a choice dic-
tated by the fact that one of the three dimensions of social capital is available only for that
year. These models were employed to assign each individual of the sample three scores,
measuring the latent factors corresponding to three potentially distinct aspects of social
capital (social networks, civic participation and neighborhood attachment). The analyses
on income volatility and unemployment spells, reported in tables from 5 to 8, are conducted
at cross sectional level over a sample of 3,183 individuals: in this case the time dimension
of data could not be exploited, since the social capital variables are constant over the time
horizon considered. In the consumption insurance tests, based on a panel regression model,
we were able to use social capital variables since they are interacted with the logarithm
and the rate of income growth. Lastly, all monetary variables were deflated by the con-
sumption deflator index (source: Eurostat). Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics.
3 Theory and the empirical strategy
The main research question of this paper consists in the empirical identification, at a
microeconomic level, of the relationship between the stock of social capital available to
individuals (households) and the availability of insurance opportunities. As a first step of
our analysis we assess the degree of consumption insurance achieved by U.K. households
in the short and in the long run applying a standard consumption insurance test a` la Mace
(1991). The formal theoretical derivation of the consumption insurance test equation in
log levels is due to Artis and Hoffmann (2012) and it allows exploiting the information
implicit in the levels of the involved variables (focusing, therefore, on the long run aspects
of the same phenomenon):
logCit = φi + νt + β log Yit + uit i = 1, 2, ...N ; t = 1, 2, ..., T (1)
where logCit and log Yit are idiosyncratic consumption and income. This is a two way panel
specification, where the inclusion of time fixed effects, νt, is tantamount to demeaning all
variables, thus expressing both consumption and income as deviations from cross sectional
averages.
Correspondingly, the short run test equation takes the following shape:
∆ logCit = µi + τt + γ∆ log Yit + it i = 1, 2, ...N ; t = 2, ..., T (2)
Within this framework, the estimate of parameters β and γ, i.e. the elasticity of idiosyn-
cratic consumption (growth) to idiosyncratic income (growth), is usually interpreted as the
3See Data Appendix for details on variables.
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extent of the deviation from a situation of full risk sharing, and measures the unsmoothed
share of shocks to idiosyncratic income, while 1-β and 1-γ are the degree of consumption
insurance achieved by a given household respectively in the long and in the short run.
Once we compute and include the social capital variables, our estimated model becomes:
logCit = φi + νt + β1 log Yit +
3∑
k=1
βk2 log YitSC
k
i + β3log YitNCi + uit (3)
where SCki is the estimated score of the social capital of the k-th type. The k types of social
capital (SCki ) are: Social Networks (SNi); Civic Participation (CPi) and Neighbourhood
Attachment (NAi). NCi is the number of household’s components. The corresponding
short run test equation is:
∆ logCit = µi + τt + γ1∆ log Yit +
3∑
k=1
γk2∆ log YitSC
k
i + γ3∆ log YitNCi + it (4)
Where β and γ take the form:
β = β1 +
3∑
k=1
βk2SC
k
i + β3NCi (5)
γ = γ1 +
3∑
k=1
γk2SC
k
i + γ3NCi (6)
and the extent of consumption insurance achieved by households in the short and in the
long run is computed as:
1− (β1 +
3∑
k=1
βk2SC
k
i + β3NCi) (7)
1− (γ1 +
3∑
k=1
γk2SC
k
i + γ3NCi) (8)
Our theoretical prior is a negative sign for βk2 and γ
k
2 for k=1,2,3, which implies a positive
effect of social capital variables onto households’ insurance possibilities both in the long
and in the short run.
We also allow for asymmetric responses of consumption to income shocks, by estimating
the following long run and short run equations:
logCit = φi + νt + β
+
1 log Y
+
it + β
−
1 log Y
−
it +
3∑
k=1
βk2
+ log Y +it SC
k
i +
3∑
k=1
βk2
− log Y −it SC
k
i
+β+3 log Y
+
it NCi + β
−
3 log Y
−
it NCi + uit
(9)
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where positive and negative shocks are associated to those levels of income corresponding
to a positive (negative) deviation of income from its long run component (computed using
a time trend). The short run equivalent of equation (9) will be:
∆ logCit = φi + νt + γ
+
1 ∆ log Y
+
it + γ
−
1 ∆ log Y
−
it +
3∑
k=1
γk2
+∆ log Y +it SC
k
i +
3∑
k=1
γk2
−∆ log Y −it SC
k
i
+γ+3 ∆ log Y
+
it NCi + γ
−
3 ∆ log Y
−
it NCi + uit
(10)
Despite the existence of a wide and growing specialized literature, the theoretical notion of
social capital remains still vague in the research community (Li et al. (2005)). This problem
is amplified in applied analyses, where the empirical counterparts of the theoretical notions
can differ even to a large extent, a fact that impedes a proper comparison of the results
obtained by different authors. In this work we have chosen to to follow the approach by Li
et al. (2005), who recognize that social capital is a multidimensional collective good origi-
nated by formal and informal engagements of individual in groups/networks. The authors
identify three aspects of social capital, i.e. Neighbourhood attachment (an informal weak
tie), Social networks (an informal strong tie) and Civic participation (a formal tie). To get
a more clear idea of the actual content of each social capital factor, the reader is referred
to the list of items which are somehow aggregated to define each of them, and that are
illustrated in the data appendix. In short, we might say that the variable Social networks
recaps some more intimate aspects of social and friendly relationships, Civic participation
is based on individuals’ engagements in well established interests groups, whereas Neigh-
bourhood attachment refers to the participation in the network formed by people residing
in the same neighbourhood. Li et al. (2005) assume that these three types of social capital
are in fact unobservable (“latent variables”), and try to measure such variables by applying
new tools provided by the Item Response Theory. Within this approach it is assumed that
each of the three latent variables drives the probability of experiencing a given outcome
for a set of observed items such as, for example, the participation to a network, that are
generally measured on a binary or an ordinal scale. Within the framework of the Item
Response Theory, the items are the questions formulated to a group of individuals, repre-
senting particular aspects of a latent factor under investigation. In our analysis, to each
of the three types of social capital, there correspond different sets of items (questions)
taken from the BHPS questionnaire. 4 Formally, let us denote by SCi one of the three
(latent) aspects of social capital available to the i-th individual, with (Xij) the (observable)
response of the i-th individual to the j-th item. Therefore, to model the probability that
an individual has a preassigned value q in a generic item we adopt, for each of the three
types of social capital, the following proportional odds logistic model:
4For a complete description of the three sets of items (questions), see the Data Appendix.
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ln
(
Pr(Xij) ≤ q
Pr(Xij) > q
)
= αq + λjSCi (11)
To estimate the model we use the GLLAMM package (Generalized Linear Latent and
Mixed Models) for Stata.5 The results of the estimates are non reported but available
upon request.6 This model was used to assign specific amounts of social capital, of the
three types, to each individual of the sample. Lastly, the overall stock of social capital of
the k-th type and for a given household was computed as the sum of the stocks of social
capital of its members.
To understand whether the effect of social capital on risk sharing goes through income pool-
ing, we also investigated over the impact of social capital on individuals’ income volatility,
by estimating the following equation:
CVi = φ0 +
3∑
k=1
φ1kSC
k
i + Φ2Zi + εit k = 1, 2, 3 (12)
where CVi is the coefficient of variation of individual income and Zi is a column vector
containing control variables.
Lastly, we explore the role of social capital in determining the probability of experiencing
unemployments spells (at an individual level), as we believe that one of the most powerful
shocks to individual well being comes through unemployment spells (see, for example, the
seminal contribution by Cochrane (1991)). We did that by estimating a Poisson model and
a probit regression. Thus, assuming that the unemployment spells variable is distributed
as a Poisson random variable of parameter λ, we estimated its expected value:
λ = E[y|xi] = exp(x′iβ) (13)
where y is the number of unemployment spells experienced by an individual over the full
time sample and xi is a vector of social capital variables (table 6 or items, as in table 7),
and controls. Finally, as a robustness check we performed a probit estimation to evaluate
the marginal effect of social capital (and of items) over the probability of experiencing
unemployment. We expect social capital to exert a negative impact on the probability
of experiencing unemployment, since a higher level of social capital should provide more
possibilities of finding a job and to move more easily from one job to another. In table 8
we report the estimation results of the following model:
Pr(Y = 1|xi) = θ(x′iβ) (14)
where Y is a binary variable (ever unemployed) taking value 1 if an individual has experi-
enced at least one unemployment spell in the sample and zero otherwise.
5We are deeply indebted to Yaojun Li for kindly providing us with the Stata code used in Li et al.
(2005).
6For a detailed description of the database and of the items employed for each latent factor see the
Data Appendix.
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4 Results
We will now explore the main empirical findings of our research. As outlined above, the
first step of our analysis consists in assessing the degree of consumption insurance achieved
by U.K. households and evaluate the impact of social capital on their insurance possibili-
ties. Before performing these tests for the long run we conducted panel unit root tests on
log levels of income (Yit), consumption of food (C
f
it) and consumption of food and other
non durables (Cfndit ) in order to exclude the possibility of a spurious long run regression.
Table 2 reports the results of panel unit root tests for small T (Harris and Tzavalis (1999))
since we have a typical microeconomic sample, characterized by a big N and a small T. All
tests reject the null hypothesis of unit root.7Consumption insurance tests are reported in
tables 3 and 4. British households seem to be better insured against shocks to income in
the short rather than in the long run, which might point at the decisive role played by sav-
ings, a consumption smoothing channel which typically works better in the long run. The
overall degree of consumption smoothing in the long run, and when social capital is not
explicitly accounted for, is about 85 percent for both categories of consumption. We can
also immediately realize that increasing the number of households’ components improves
on the degree of consumption smoothing (i.e. reduces the co-movement of consumption
relative to income). When social capital variables are explicitly taken into account we
realize that the coefficient of social networks is not statistically significant, while those of
the other two measures of social capital (civic participation and neighborhood attachment)
are and, on average, they account 8 for a reduction of about 3 percent and 3.5 percent of
the unsmoothed component of consumption, respectively (panel a, columns (3) and (4) in
table 3). This may seem a tiny percentage, but in fact the picture changes if we compute
the increase in consumption smoothing associated to a one standard deviation of those
variables: the corresponding decrease in the unsmoothed component would be about 9
percent for civic participation, and 8 percent for neighbourhood attachment.
In the short run (panel b, table 3) we obtain a similar, positive, impact of social capital
on consumption insurance, though seemingly weaker: social networks, again, do not seem
to have a statistically significant effect, civic participation looses significance (most likely
in view of the increase in overall variability), while neighborhood attachment keeps a sta-
tistically significant and positive impact, but only for the broader consumption aggregate.
U.K. households seem to be almost fully insured in the short run given that, for example,
γ1 in table 3 column (4) is equal to 0.0587, which implies a degree of consumption smooth-
ing of about 94 percent, further increased by the impact of social networks (however, the
corresponding coefficient’s estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels),
by neighborhood attachment and by the numerical composition of the household. Sum-
ming up all those effects, the overall degree of consumption insurance is virtually complete.
We can clearly see that the positive effects of social capital are more pronounced in the
long run rather than in the short run, in absolute value. For instance, civic participation
7Harris and Tzavalis (1999) tests were also performed, including panel mean and/or trend and the null
was always rejected.
8This is computed as in equation (7).
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variable reduces the unsmoothed part of risk by 0.25 percent in the long run and by 0.06
percent in the short run, on average (if we consider Cfndit ), whereas neighbourhood attach-
ment increases consumption insurance by 0.20 percent in the long run and by 0.14 percent
in the short run. In other words, the role of social capital in smoothing consumption is
more relevant in the long run when, as often evoked by a strand of literature, the credit
channel of smoothing may become less effective and individuals may face more credit re-
strictions.9 According to the empirical evidence in Guiso et al. (2004), we might conjecture
that the positive impact of social capital on consumption insurance in the long run is im-
putable to improvements in the credit channel of smoothing. Table 4 reports results for the
same consumption insurance tests as in table 3, but allowing for asymmetric responses of
consumption to income shocks (estimated equations number (9) and (10)). This analysis
mainly confirms the results displayed in table 3. We detect no asymmetry in responses of
consumption to income shocks, as coefficients attached to positive and negative shocks are
always both significant (or non significant) and very similar in magnitude. This is true also
for the social capital interaction variables: social capital seems to help smoothing negative
as well as positive shocks to income.
The analysis reported in table 4 further confirms how social capital plays a more relevant
role in the long run rather than in the short run since social capital interaction variables,
in the short run, turn out to be non significant in case of both positive and negative shocks
(but for neighbourhood attachment which is negative statistically significant in the face of
positive shocks).
The results of the third step of our empirical analysis are reported in table 5. We com-
puted the coefficient of variation of idiosyncratic income and regressed it against our social
capital variables and a set of controls (refer to Data Appendix for a description of the
dependent variable, control variables and regressors) in order to study the impact of social
capital over income volatility, which is key in understanding consumption insurance. Our
prior was that social capital should reduce income volatility particularly with respect to
negative shocks, and thus we estimated equation (12) for the coefficient of variation itself
and for its positive (over the mean) and negative (below the mean) counterparts. We use
an instrumental variable regression with the following instruments: marital status, age,
human capital and the interaction between age and marital status and human capital (A
test of endogeneity and the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions are reported in
table 5). Results are completely consistent with our previous analysis: civic participation
and neighbourhood attachment lower income volatility, while social networks is not sta-
tistically significant. The same conclusions hold when we separately look at “upside” and
“downside” income smoothing. Among the various results, it is worth noticing that if an
individual has “no religion”, this impacts positively on (lowers) income volatility, while the
same holds for being Roman Catholic and for belonging to black/british african ethnicity.
Moreover “singles” (people who have never been married or separated, divorced, widow)
feature a less volatile income.
Table 6 and table 7 report the estimation results for the Poisson regression of unemploy-
9E.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996); Becker and Hoffmann (2006).
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ment spells. We investigate the hypothesis that social capital can reduce the average
number of unemployments spells experienced by individuals. We estimated equation (13)
using as regressors our social capital variables and a set of controls (table 6). We also
conducted the same analysis directly including the survey questions on social capital (the
items used to construct our social capital variables through the Item Response Theory) as
regressors (table 7). When we consider social capital variables as regressors, results seem
to be clear-cut: all three aspects of social capital are statistically significant and negative
with respect to different equation specifications, i.e. they have a negative impact on the
average number of spells an individual experienced over the sample period (1996-2006).10
Human capital in the form of the attainment of a level of education corresponding to a
degree, a master degree or a doctorate always lowers numbers of unemployment spells.
Married people, as well as white British, withe Irish, white scottish, Anglicans, Roman
Catholics and Christians (no denom.) feature a lower (average) number of unemployment
spells. Lastly, Looking at table 7 we can check the impact of each item (survey questions
on social capital): but for few exceptions,11 all items entering significantly in the regression
display a negative coefficient, confirming the positive role played by social capital on the
average number of unemployment spells. Control variables on race, religion, human capi-
tal and marital status qualitatively confirm the results reported in table 6. In Table 8 we
report the last empirical exercise, where we constructed a binary variable12 taking value
one if an individual has experienced at least one employment spell over the sample period
and zero otherwise. By using a probit estimation we estimated the marginal effects13 of
social capital and a set of controls over the probability of experiencing an unemployment
spell. All three aspects of social capital (at least when we include control variables) reduce
such a probability. On the other hand, being black/british caribbean, singles, employee
increases the probability of unemployment spells. The opposite is true for married people
and for those having a permanent job. Items entering significantly with a negative sign
are mainly attributable to the second aspect of social capital (civic participation).
5 Conclusions
That repeated social interactions may foster risk sharing among individuals, in the form
of both income and consumption smoothing, has surfaced in several recent contributions.
However, a proper empirical validation of this hypothesis has been partial, at most, and
concentrated on under developed or developing economic setups. We tried to fill this gap
by proposing a risk sharing analysis on British individuals and households, where various
10This analysis is a cross section: the variable “unemployment spells” is constructed as the number of
unemployments spells experienced by an individual over the sample period. See data appendix for details.
11i.e. “more than one who really appreciate you; “more than one who comforts you”; “participation in
political party”; “participation in social group”.
12Based on the variable “unemployment spells”. See data appendix for details.
13Reported in table 8.
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dimensions of social capital accumulation have been derived from BHPS microdata, by
using some recently developed econometric tools based on the Item Response Theory. The
dimensions of social capital that we explore, following Li et al. (2005), are: Social Net-
works, Neighbourhood Attachment, and Civic Participation. Our empirical results point at
a positive role of the last two forms of social capital on risk sharing, whereas the first would
not seem to play any role. The same conclusion we obtain in the context of an income
smoothing analysis, while an even stronger result is yielded by a Probit and a Poisson
analysis on the occurrence and the frequency of unemployment spells: in this case, all
three forms of social capital play a positive role in insuring agents with respect to both the
occurrence and the relative frequency of unemployment shocks.
Although we believe our results are quite robust, as they survived different model speci-
fications, we are also convinced that more detailed micro data, uncovering explicit links
and networks structures among individuals and households would be extremely useful to
properly quantify the impact of social capital on risk sharing mechanisms.
6 Data Appendix14
Waves included: from G to Q (from year 1996 to year 2006).
All “missing or wild” cases (which take value -9), “don’t know” cases (which take value -1),
“proxy respondent” cases (which take value -7), “refused” cases (which take value -2) and
“inapplicable”15 cases (which take value -8) are considered missing values, thus excluded.
For analyses reported from table 5 to 8 all control variables described below were used in
the following way: for each realization of the variable, a dummy was created and included
in the regressions.
Age: (W)AGE
Asymmetric shocks to income: log Y +it and ∆ log Y
+
it represent positive shocks, income
and income growth rate are multiplied by a dummy variable which takes value 1 in corre-
spondence of a positive deviation of income from its long run component (computed using
a time trend) and zero otherwise. The complement to 1 of the aforementioned dummy
variable multiplied by income and the rate of growth of income gives the negative shock
variables log Y −it and ∆ log Y
−
it .
Coefficient of variation (CVi) of idiosyncratic income: CVi stands for Coefficient
of Variation of the idiosyncratic component of income. Idiosyncratic income is com-
puted following Pierucci and Ventura (2010) as the residual of the following regression
log(yit) = β̂ log(yat) + eit, where log(yit) is individual’s income and log(yat) is the average
income of the reference group.This method guarantees orthogonality between aggregate
14Name of variables as in British Households Panel Survey are reported in capital letters. (W) represents
the generic wave W. Data elaboration is quite complex, this appendix aims to be as much accurate as
possible, however it can not be completely exhaustive. Stata codes generating the dataset are available
upon request.
15Exceptions to this case are reported in the description of variables.
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and idiosyncratic components of income. CV +i and CV
−
i represent the positive (over the
mean) and the negative (below the mean) counterparts of the Coefficient of Variation.
Consumption:
1) non durables
Amount spent on gas (W)XPGASY ;
Amount spent on electricity (W)XPLECY;
Amount spent on oil (W)XPOILY;
Amount spent on coal/other (W)XPSFLY;
2) food
Total weekly food and grocery bill (W)XPFOOD.
Food consumption data were converted from weekly classes to numeric annual values, mul-
tiplying average weekly consumption of each class by number of weeks in a year (53). Data
on non durable goods are annual. Our dependent variables in test regressions (tab 3 and
tab 4) are the log level and the rate of growth of: Cfit, which stands for consumption of
food and Cfndit , which stands for consumption of food plus non durables.
Employee or self-employed: based on variable (W)JBSEMP taking value 1 for em-
ployee, 2 for self-employed and -8 for inapplicable. For each individual, number of years
(over the full sample 1996-2006) for each realization of the variable was computed. A
variable named dum-empl was calculated using a “predominance” approach: an individual
is considered employee if he/she was employed for the majority of time as employee. This
variable assumes values from 1 to 3 (namely: employee, self-employed and inapplicable).
Households’ income: Annual h/h income=Sum the values of individual annual total
income for individuals in the household (W)FIHHYR.
Human capital: based on the variable (W)QFEDHI taking 13 realizations corresponding
to 13 “highest” levels of education. We assumed this variable, over our sample period, to
be time invariant and we choose to impute to each individual the qualification possessed
at median year (2001). Thus we computed the corresponding number of years of education
to each qualification converting a categorical variable into a numeric variable reporting
“years of education”. This variable was named human capital and used as instrument in
the IV regression whose results are reported in table 5. Human capital was used as control
variable in the analyses reported from table 5 to 8 once converted in a dummy (named
degree and over which takes value 1 for those having a degree or more and zero otherwise.
Individual income: Annual individual income (W)FIYR=Annual gross labour income
(W)FIYRL+Annual non-labour income (W)FIYRNL
Marital status: based on variable (W)MLSTAT. The (W)MLSTAT variable was recoded
in order to get: value 1 if married, value 2 if separated or divorced, value 3 if widow and
value 4 if never married. Over the full sample (1996-2006), for each individual, the number
of years in each status (married, separated or divorced, widow, never married) was calcu-
lated. Finally, a variable named status was calculated using a “predominance” approach:
each individual was considered in a specific status (let say married) if the number of years
spent in that status was bigger than the number of years spent in any other status. The
status variable takes values from 1 to 4 (married, separated or divorced, widow, never
married, respectively).
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Number of household’s components: We compute the number of components of house-
holds included in our sample (households included in our sample have a stable structure).
Permanent or temporary job: based on variable (W)JBTERM1 which assumes value
1 for permanent job, 2 for transitory job and -8 for inapplicable. For each individual,
number of years (over the full sample 1996-2006) for each realization of the variable was
computed. A variable named dum-perm was calculated using a “predominance” approach:
each individual was considered having a permanent job if he/she had been employed for the
majority of time with a permanent job. This variable assumes values from 1 to 3 (namely:
permanent, transitory and inapplicable).
Race: variable (W)RACEL taken only from wave M since this control variable is time
invariant.
Religion: (W)OPRLG1 taken from wave N, give the limited time horizon considered, we
assume this control variable to be time invariant.
Social capital variables.
I. Social Networks (SNi)
16: list of questions (items) included taken from wave M-Social
Support Networks file (individual questionnaire INDRESP.). For analyses at household
level, the factor is given by the average of household’s members factors.
1) Anyone to listen when you need to talk? (W)SSUPA
2) Anyone to help you out in a crisis? (W)SSUPB
3) Anyone to be totally yourself with? (W)SSUPC
4) Anyone really appreciates you as a person? (W)SSUPD
5) Anyone to comfort you when you are very upset? (W)SSUPE
6) Anyone outside h/h to help you if depressed? (W)XSUPA
7) Anyone outside h/h to help you to get job? (W)XSUPB
8) Anyone outside h/h to lend you money? (W)XSUPC
All questions on Social Networks were recoded to be increasing from 1 to 3 (no-one; yes
one person; more than one). For analyses reported in table 7 and table 8 a dummy variable
was created for the highest category of each question and then included in the regression.
II. Civic Participation (CPi)
17: list of questions (items) included taken from wave
M-Social and Interest Group Activity (and membership) file (individual questionnaire IN-
DRESP.). For analyses at household level, the factor is given by the average of household’s
members factors.
1) Active in political party (W)ORGAA
2) Active in trade unions (W)ORGAB)
3) Active in environmental group (W)ORGAC
4) Active in parents association (W)ORGAD
5) Active in tenants/resident’s group (W)ORGAE
6) Active in religious group (W)ORGAF
16List of questions (items) on Social Support Networks employed to compute that latent aspect of social
capital given by social networks. For a detailed description of the methodology applied, see section 4.
17List of questions (items) on Social and Interest Group Activity employed to compute that latent
aspect of social capital given by civic participation. For a detailed description of the methodology applied,
see section 4.
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7) Active in voluntary group (W)ORGAG
8) Active in other community group (W)ORGAH
9) Active in social group (W)ORGAI
10) Active in sports club (W)ORGAJ
11) Active in womens’s institute (W)ORGAK
12) Active in womens’s group (W)ORGAL
13) Active in other organization (W)ORGAM
14) Active in professional organisation (W)ORGAO
15) Active in pensioner’s organisation (W)ORGAP
16) Active in scouts/guide groups (W)ORGAQ
All questions on Civic participation were recoded to take values from 1 to 2 (no; yes). For
analyses reported in table 7 and table 8 a dummy variable was created for the highest
category of each question and then included in the regression.
III. Neighbourhood Attachement (NAi)
18: list of questions (items) included taken
from wave M-Neighbourhood and Residence file (individual questionnaire INDRESP.). For
analyses at household level, the factor is given by the average of household’s members fac-
tors.
1) I belong to this neighbourhood (W)OPNGBHA
2) Friends in my neighbourhood mean a lot (W)OPNGBHB
3) Advice available from my neighbourhood (W)OPNGBHC
4) Borrow and exchange and favours with neighbours (W)OPNGBHD
5) Improve my neighbourhood (W)OPNGBHE
6) Would remain in the neighbourhood (W)OPNGBHF
7) Similar to others in the neighbourhood (W)OPNGBHG
8) Regularly stop and talk with neighbours (W)OPNGBHH
All questions on Neighbourhood Attachement were recoded to be increasing from 1 to 5
(strongly disagree; disagree; neither agree/disagree; agree; strongly agree). For analyses in
tables 7 and 8 category 4 an 5 were aggregated and a dummy variable was created for the
highest category (4 and 5) of each question and then included in the regression.
Spouse/partner employed now (partner works): based on variable (W)SPJB which
assumes value 0 if spouse or partner works, 1 if spouse or partner does not work and -8 for
inapplicable. For each individual, number of years (over the full sample 1996-2006) for each
realization of the variable was computed. A variable named pwork was calculated using
a “predominance” approach: each individual was considered to have spouse or partner at
work if the number of years for which spouse or partner had been working are more than
years for which spouse or partner had been unemployed, and if the status variable assumes
value 1 (married). In order to avoid data losses (mainly due to the presence of widow,
separated or divorced and never married among the inapplicable cases) we imposed that
for realizations 2, 3 and 4 of the status variable (namely: separated or divorced, widow,
18List of questions (items) on Neighbourhood and Residence employed to compute that latent aspect
of social capital given by Neighbourhood Attachement. For a detailed description of the methodology
applied, see section 4.
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never married) the variable pwork assumes value 3 (we refer to this realization of the pwork
variable as “singles”). The variable work assumes value 1 for spouse or partner working,
2 for spouse or partner not working.
Unemployment spells: number of unemployment spells in a year (W)NJUSP. We com-
puted the dependent variable used in tables 6 and 7 as the total number of unemployment
spells over the full sample (1996-2006).
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Table 1: Main descriptive statistics 1996-2006
panel a) Households
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Score for Social Networks (SNi) 11913 0.0763 1.2662 −4.9965 1.6864
Score for Civic Participation (CPi) 11913 0.0605 0.3148 −0.2022 1.4700
Score for Neighbourhood Attachment (NAi) 11913 0.1624 1.3791 −4.6697 4.6305
Number of households’ components 11913 2.0905 1.0671 1.0000 6.0000
Amount spent on gas in real terms 11913 311.3345 227.9114 0.0000 6850.6190
Amount spent on oil in real terms 11913 17.3256 109.9643 0.0000 3277.1540
Amount on electricity in real terms 11913 304.5177 200.6890 −3.8760 7000.0000
Amount on coal/other in real terms 11913 10.9511 64.6330 0.0000 1178.7820
Household’s real income 11913 26019.1500 18121.4100 0.5495 264336.6000
Log of household’s real income 11913 9.9404 0.7210 −0.5988 12.4850
Rate of growth of household’s real income (∆ log Yit) 10830 0.0169 0.4621 −10.4349 10.4368
Real food consumption 11913 3214.9300 1470.7320 240.8564 8462.2640
Log real food consumption 11913 7.9607 0.5047 5.4842 9.0434
Rate of growth real food consumption (∆ log(C
f
it)) 10830 0.0126 0.3023 −2.2021 2.6097
Real food and non durables consumption 11913 3859.0590 1614.0540 334.3465 17728.8300
Log of real food and non durables consumption 11913 8.1657 0.4451 5.8122 9.7829
Rate of growth of real food and non durables consumption (∆ log(C
fnd
it )) 10830 0.0136 0.2533 −1.4247 1.8071
panel b) Individuals
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sex 3183 0.5514 0.4974 0 1
Individual real income 3183 17831.0800 13191.2300 110.9091 226772.8000
Log of individual real income 3183 9.4181 0.7788 4.1525 12.0338
Rate of growth of individual real income 3183 0.0307 0.1054 −1.1516 0.9381
Age 3183 42.3491 10.0245 22.1818 60.9091
Unemployment spells 3183 0.4439 1.1228 0.0000 12.0000
Ever Unemployed 3183 0.2215 0.4153 0.0000 1.0000
Score for Social Networks (SNi) 3183 0.2252 1.4560 −4.9965 1.6864
Score for Civic Participation (CPi) 3183 0.0378 0.3472 −0.2022 1.6153
Score for Neighbourhood Attachment (NAi) 3183 −0.0540 1.5863 −6.0783 4.6305
Coefficient of Variation of the idiosyncratic income (CVi) 3183 0.0463 0.0569 0.0006 0.5655
Coefficient of Variation of the idiosyncratic income (positive, CV +i ) 3183 0.0322 0.0405 0.0005 0.4021
Coefficient of Variation of the idiosyncratic income (negative, CV−i ) 3183 0.0325 0.0406 0.0004 0.4486
Food consumption data were converted from weekly classes to numeric annual values, multiplying average weekly consumption of each class by number of
weeks in a year (54). Data on non durable goods are annual. At household level, the Social Capital factors are given by the average of household’s members
factors. For details on variables, refer to Data Appendix.
Table 2: Panel Unit-Root Tests
(Harris and Tzavalis (1999))
VARIABLES statistic Z p-value
log Yit 0.3122 −49.5575 0.0000
log(C
f
it) 0.2658 −55.0948 0.0000
log(C
fnd
it ) 0.3047 −50.4494 0.0000
Ho: panels contain unit roots; H1: panels are station-
ary. Tests were performed also including panel mean
and/or trend and the null was always rejected (re-
sults not reported here, available upon request). Test
were conducted applying Stata command xtunitroot
ht with option altt which use T-1 for computation of
mean and variance of the test statistic under the null
hypothesis.
Table 3: Test of consumption insurance-households
panel a) consumption insurance test-log levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(C
f
it) log(C
fnd
it ) log(C
f
it) log(C
fnd
it )
β1(log Yit) 0.1549∗∗∗ 0.1357∗∗∗ 0.1602∗∗∗ 0.1407∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
β12(log Yit) ∗ SNi 0.0025 0.0014
(0.005) (0.004)
β22(log Yit) ∗ CPi −0.0494∗∗∗ −0.0417∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.016)
β32(log Yit) ∗NAi −0.0080∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
β3(log Yit) ∗NCi −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0257∗∗∗ −0.0226∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 6.9830∗∗∗ 7.3538∗∗∗ 6.9975∗∗∗ 7.3614∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.053) (0.064) (0.055)
Observations 11913 11913 11913 11913
R-squared 0.057 0.074 0.058 0.076
Number of households 1083 1083 1083 1083
panel b) consumption insurance test-growth rates
VARIABLES ∆ log(C
f
it) ∆ log(C
fnd
it ) ∆ log(C
f
it) ∆ log(C
fnd
it )
γ1(∆ log Yit) 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
γ12 (∆ log Yit) ∗ SNi 0.0057 0.0036
(0.006) (0.005)
γ22 (∆ log Yit) ∗ CPi −0.0127 −0.0110
(0.020) (0.017)
γ32 (∆ log Yit) ∗NAi −0.0046 −0.0084∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
γ3(∆ log Yit) ∗NCi −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0172∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗ −0.0169∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant 0.0060 0.0100 0.0117 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Observations 10830 10830 10830 10830
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006
Number of households 1083 1083 1083 1083
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated test equation
in panel a) log(Cit) = φi + νt + β1(log Yit) +
∑3
k=1 β
k
2 (log Yit)SC
k
i + β3(log Yit)NCi +
uit. Estimated test equation in panel b) ∆ log(Cit) = µi + τt + γ1(∆ log Yit) +∑3
k=1 γ
k
2 (∆ log Yit)SC
k
i + γ3(∆ log Yit)NCi + it. The k types of social capital (SC
k
i ) are:
Social Networks (SNi); Civic Participation (CPi) and Neighbourhood Attachment (NAi).
NC represents number of household’s components. Individual and time dummies included.
Test performed is a standard test introduced by (e.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996)) (then extended
as “conditional beta” test regression, among others, by Melitz and Zumer (1999)) with the
novelty of social capital interaction variables. C
f
it stands consumption of food, C
fnd
it stands
for consumption of food plus other non durables.
Table 4: Test of consumption insurance with asymmetric
shocks-households
panel a) consumption insurance test with asymmetric shocks-log levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(C
f
it) log(C
fnd
it ) log(C
f
it) log(C
fnd
it )
β+1 (log Yit)
+ 0.1416∗∗∗ 0.1246∗∗∗ 0.1550∗∗∗ 0.1375∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
β−1 (log Yit)
− 0.1421∗∗∗ 0.1250∗∗∗ 0.1561∗∗∗ 0.1384∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
β12
+(log Yit)
+ ∗ SNi −0.0030 −0.0040
(0.006) (0.005)
β12
−(log Yit)− ∗ SNi −0.0029 −0.0040
(0.006) (0.005)
β22
+(log Yit)
+ ∗ CPi −0.0626∗∗∗ −0.0526∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018)
β22
−(log Yit)− ∗ CPi −0.0650∗∗∗ −0.0551∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.019)
β32
+(log Yit)
+ ∗NAi −0.0085∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
β32
−(log Yit)− ∗NAi −0.0084∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
β+3 (log Yit)
+ ∗NCi −0.0200∗∗∗ −0.0181∗∗∗ −0.0238∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
β−3 (log Yit)
− ∗NCi −0.0196∗∗∗ −0.0177∗∗∗ −0.0236∗∗∗ −0.0209∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant 6.9158∗∗∗ 7.2498∗∗∗ 6.9162∗∗∗ 7.2430∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.061) (0.075) (0.064)
Observations 10830 10830 10830 10830
R-squared 0.048 0.070 0.050 0.073
Number of households 1083 1083 1083 1083
panel b) consumption insurance test with asymmetric shocks-growth rates
VARIABLES ∆ log(C
f
it) ∆ log(C
fnd
it ) ∆ log(C
f
it) ∆ log(C
fnd
it )
γ+1 (∆ log Yit)
+ 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
γ−1 (∆ log Yit)
− 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗ 0.0558∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021)
γ12
+(∆ log Yit)
+ ∗ SNi 0.0064 0.0015
(0.010) (0.008)
γ12
−(∆ log Yit)− ∗ SNi 0.0051 0.0054
(0.008) (0.007)
γ22
+(∆ log Yit)
+ ∗ CPi −0.0232 −0.0277
(0.031) (0.026)
γ22
−(∆ log Yit)− ∗ CPi −0.0026 0.0077
(0.031) (0.026)
γ32
+(∆ log Yit)
+ ∗NAi −0.0059 −0.0116∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
γ32
−(∆ log Yit)− ∗NAi −0.0033 −0.0054
(0.005) (0.005)
γ+3 (∆ log Yit)
+ ∗NCi −0.0220∗ −0.0167∗ −0.0221∗ −0.0174∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
γ−3 (∆ log Yit)
− ∗NCi −0.0220∗ −0.0177∗ −0.0209∗ −0.0159
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Constant 0.0122 0.0133∗ 0.0051 0.0096
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Observations 10830 10830 10830 10830
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006
Number of households 1083 1083 1083 1083
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated test equa-
tion in panel a) logCit = φi + νt + β
+
1 log Y
+
it + β
−
1 log Y
−
it +
∑3
k=1 β
k
2
+ log Y +it SC
k
i +∑3
k=1 β
k
2
− log Y−it SC
k
i + β
+
3 log Y
+
itNCi + β
−
3 log Y
−
it NCi + uit. Estimated test equation
in panel b) ∆ logCit = φi + νt + γ
+
1 ∆ log Y
+
it + γ
−
1 ∆ log Y
−
it +
∑3
k=1 γ
k
2
+∆ log Y +it SC
k
i +∑3
k=1 γ
k
2
−∆ log Y−it SC
k
i + γ
+
3 ∆ log Y
+
itNCi + γ
−
3 ∆ log Y
−
it NCi + uit. The k types of social
capital (SCki ) are: Social Networks (SNi); Civic Participation (CPi) and Neighbourhood
Attachement (NAi). NC represents number of household’s components. Individual and time
dummies included. Test performed is a standard test introduced by (e.g. Asdrubali et al.
(1996)) (then extended as “conditional beta” test regression, among others, by Melitz and
Zumer (1999)) with the novelty of social capital interaction variables and the possibility of
asymmetric responses of consumption to income shocks. log Y +it and ∆ log Y
+
it represent pos-
itive shocks, income and income growth rate are multiplied by a dummy variable which takes
value 1 in correspondence of a positive deviation of income from its long run component
(computed using a time trend) and zero otherwise. The a1 complement of the aforementioned
dummy variable multiplied by income and the rate of growth of income gives the negative
shock variables log Y−it and ∆ log Y
−
it . C
f
it stands consumption of food, C
fnd
it stands for
consumption of food plus other non durables.
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Table 5: Idiosyncratic income volatility of individuals
VARIABLES CVi CV
+
i CV
−
i
SNi 0.0085 0.0044 0.0072
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
CPi −0.0149∗∗ −0.0118∗∗ −0.0090∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
NAi −0.0480∗∗ −0.0355∗∗ −0.0299∗
(0.024) (0.018) (0.016)
age −0.0047∗∗∗−0.0036∗∗∗−0.0029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
agesq 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No religion −0.0173∗∗ −0.0129∗∗ −0.0107∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Roman Catholic −0.0088 −0.0055 −0.0063
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Christian (no denom.) 0.0184∗∗ 0.0128∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
White irish 0.0291∗ 0.0223∗ 0.0181∗
(0.017) (0.012) (0.011)
Other white −0.0088 −0.0057 −0.0063
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Mixed black and white caribbean −0.0367∗∗ −0.0259∗∗ −0.0250∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009)
Mixed black and white african 0.0650∗ 0.0509∗ 0.0387∗
(0.036) (0.029) (0.021)
Black/british caribbean −0.0202∗ −0.0154 −0.0124∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Black/british African −0.0506∗∗∗−0.0350∗∗∗−0.0347∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
Chinese 0.1352∗ 0.0734∗ 0.1121
(0.079) (0.040) (0.069)
Unemployment spells 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Singles −0.0135∗∗∗−0.0097∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.1430∗∗∗ 0.1089∗∗∗ 0.0907∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.027) (0.024)
Test of Endogeneity [0.0045] [0.0008] [0.0259]
Hansen’s test of over identifying restrictions [0.9767] [0.9132] [0.9937]
Observations 3183 3183 3183
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. p-values in squared
parentheses. Estimated test equation CVi = φ0+
∑3
k=1 φ1kSC
k
i +Φ2Zi.The k types of
social capital (SCki ) are: Social Networks (SNi); Civic Participation (CPi) and Neigh-
bourhood Attachement (NAi. CVi stands for Coefficient of Variation of the idiosyn-
cratic component of income. Idiosyncratic income is computed following Pierucci and
Ventura (2010) as the residual of the following regression log(yit) = β̂ log(yat) + eit,
where log(yit) is individual’s income and log(yat) is the average income of the refer-
ence group. This method guarantees orthogonality between aggregate and idiosyncratic
components of income. CV +i and CV
−
i represent the positive (over the mean) and the
negative (below the mean) parts of the Coefficient of Variation. In the analysis re-
ported in this table Scores for Social Networks (SNi), Civic Participation (CPi) and
Neighbourhood Attachment (NAi) are standardized. Instrumental variable regression
was performed, instruments are: marital status, age, human capital (years of educa-
tion) and the interaction of age and marital status as well as the interaction between
age and human capital. For details on control variables and regressors, refer to data
appendix.
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Table 6: Unemployment spells-Poisson regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Unempl. Spells Unempl. Spells Unempl. Spells Unempl. Spells
SNi −0.0500∗∗∗ −0.0766∗∗∗ −0.0691∗∗∗ −0.0662∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
CPi −0.6009∗∗∗ −0.4913∗∗∗ −0.4654∗∗∗ −0.4782∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095)
NAi −0.0961∗∗∗ −0.0676∗∗∗ −0.0648∗∗∗ −0.0673∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Anglican −0.2993∗∗∗ −0.2949∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062)
Roman Catholic −0.4133∗∗∗ −0.4219∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.115)
Baptist 0.6243∗ 0.6464∗∗
(0.322) (0.322)
Christian (no denom) −0.3342∗∗ −0.3297∗∗
(0.159) (0.159)
Muslim 0.7075∗∗
(0.346)
Hindu −1.7406∗∗∗
(0.613)
Jewish −1.9177∗ −1.8857∗
(1.002) (1.002)
Sikh 1.2471∗∗∗
(0.253)
White British −0.2440∗∗∗
(0.063)
White Irish −0.7509∗
(0.452)
White Scottish −0.2117∗
(0.113)
Other White 0.3473∗∗∗
(0.117)
Asian/British Indian 1.1327∗∗∗
(0.213)
Asian/British Pakistani −1.3913∗
(0.789)
Black/British Caribbean 0.8395∗∗∗ 1.0335∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.260)
Other Black 1.6640∗∗∗ 1.8796∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.450)
Married −0.6774∗∗∗ −0.7976∗∗∗ −0.7870∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.057) (0.057)
Widow −0.5692∗∗ −0.5453∗∗
(0.252) (0.252)
Never married 0.2030∗∗∗
(0.071)
Degree and over −0.5269∗∗∗ −0.4861∗∗∗ −0.5091∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.181) (0.182)
Partner works 0.2385∗∗ 0.2532∗∗∗ 0.2445∗∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Permanent job −1.0003∗∗∗ −0.9578∗∗∗ −0.9770∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.126) (0.126)
Temporary job 0.3842∗∗ 0.4648∗∗∗ 0.4056∗∗
(0.164) (0.157) (0.160)
Employee 0.6654∗∗∗ 0.6570∗∗∗ 0.6382∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
Constant −0.8231∗∗∗
(0.027)
Observations 3183 3183 3183 3183
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.SNi, CPi and NAi stand for factors
representing respectively the k aspects of Social Capital (SCki ): Social Networks, Civic Participation and
Neighborhood Attachment. Dependent variable is given by numbers of unemployment spells occurred
in the sample period. For details on dependent variable, control variables and regressors, refer to data
appendix.
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Table 7: Unemployment spells-Poisson regression with BHPS questions on social capital (items)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Unempl.Spells Unempl. Spells Unempl. Spells Unempl. Spells
More than one who helps in a crisis −0.3800∗∗∗ −0.3228∗∗∗ −0.3317∗∗∗ −0.3481∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076)
More than one with whom to be totally yourself −0.1946∗∗ −0.2292∗∗∗ −0.2825∗∗∗ −0.2739∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079)
More than one who really appreciates you 0.1852∗∗ 0.2365∗∗∗ 0.2612∗∗∗ 0.2644∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
More than one who comforts you 0.2784∗∗∗ 0.2027∗∗ 0.2146∗∗ 0.2429∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084)
More than one outside household who helps you −0.1328∗ −0.2452∗∗∗ −0.2194∗∗∗ −0.2460∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Participation in political party 0.5143∗ 0.5228∗
(0.303) (0.302)
Participation in trade unions −0.3847∗∗ −0.5405∗∗∗ −0.3931∗∗ −0.4124∗∗
(0.160) (0.172) (0.161) (0.161)
Participation in environmental group 0.4116∗∗ 0.4998∗∗∗ 0.4460∗∗ 0.5060∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.192) (0.192) (0.187)
Participation in parents association −0.6663∗∗∗ −0.7071∗∗∗ −0.8095∗∗∗ −0.7457∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.157) (0.155) (0.156)
Active in religious group −0.2657∗∗ −0.2074∗
(0.104) (0.107)
Participation in social group 0.2702∗∗∗ 0.2680∗∗∗ 0.2628∗∗∗ 0.2518∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Participation in sports club −0.2538∗∗∗ −0.2311∗∗∗ −0.2162∗∗∗ −0.2272∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075)
Participation in professional organization −0.8924∗∗∗ −0.8450∗∗∗ −0.8693∗∗∗ −0.8710∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.199) (0.198) (0.199)
Participation in pensioner’s organization −1.6621∗
(1.003)
Participation in Scouts/guide groups −0.6732∗∗ −0.5108∗ −0.4672∗
(0.280) (0.282) (0.282)
Belong to neighbourhood −0.1452∗∗
(0.066)
Friends in neighbourhood mean a lot −0.1283∗∗ −0.1239∗ −0.1172∗
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Borrow and exchange favor with my neighbours −0.1146∗∗
(0.058)
Improve my neighbourhood 0.1366∗ 0.1289∗
(0.074) (0.074)
Would remain in the neighborhood −0.3189∗∗∗ −0.2175∗∗∗ −0.2149∗∗∗ −0.2164∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Similar to other in the neghbourehood −0.1829∗∗∗ −0.1370∗∗ −0.1401∗∗ −0.1259∗∗
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Regularly stop and talk with neighbours 0.2051∗∗∗ 0.1391∗∗ 0.1268∗ 0.1272∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
White british −0.3319∗∗∗
(0.093)
White Irish −0.7879∗
(0.458)
White Welsh −0.2828∗
(0.164)
White Scottish −0.3550∗∗∗
(0.135)
Other White 0.2968∗∗
(0.118)
Asian/British Indian 1.0241∗∗∗
(0.215)
Black/British Caribbean 0.8319∗∗∗ 1.0417∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.263)
Other Black 1.6152∗∗∗
(0.497)
Anglican −0.3445∗∗∗ −0.3304∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
Roman Catholic −0.4452∗∗∗ −0.4498∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.116)
Christian (no denom) −0.3993∗∗ −0.3782∗∗
(0.160) (0.160)
Hindu −1.7568∗∗∗
(0.615)
Jewish −2.0209∗∗ −2.0117∗∗
(1.003) (1.003)
Sikh 1.1133∗∗∗
(0.258)
Employee 0.6879∗∗∗ 1.0283∗∗∗ 1.0341∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.143) (0.143)
self employed 0.3614∗∗ 0.3749∗∗
(0.170) (0.170)
Partner works 0.2026∗∗ 0.2168∗∗ −0.6364∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.099)
Partner does not work −0.8571∗∗∗
(0.066)
Permanent job −1.0333∗∗∗ −1.4114∗∗∗ −1.4053∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.130) (0.130)
Temporary job 0.3548∗∗
(0.170)
Married −0.8525∗∗∗ −0.8109∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.059)
Separated or Divorced −0.1435∗ −0.1407∗
(0.079) (0.079)
Widow −0.8119∗∗∗ −0.7493∗∗∗ −0.8046∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.254) (0.256)
Degree and over −0.4465∗∗ −0.4645∗∗ −0.4960∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.183) (0.183)
Constant −0.1700∗ 0.8929∗∗∗ 0.5801∗∗∗ 0.6009∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.139) (0.116) (0.120)
Observations 3183 3183 3183 3183
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables is given by numbers of unemployment spells occurred in the sample
period. For details on dependent variable, control variables and regressors (survey questions on social capital), refer to data appendix.
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Table 8: Occurrence of unemployment-Probit estimation
panel a) Probit regression with social capital variables
VARIABLES ever unemployed ever unemployed
SNi −0.0034 −0.0095∗
(0.005) (0.005)
CPi −0.0993∗∗∗ −0.0828∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
NAi −0.0197∗∗∗ −0.0143∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Black/British Caribbean 0.3515∗∗
(0.161)
Married −0.1076∗∗∗
(0.022)
Singles 0.0568∗∗
(0.025)
Employee 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.025)
Permanent job −0.1338∗∗∗
(0.034)
Observations 3183 3183
R-squared 0.0129 0.0452
panel b) Probit regression with BHPS questions on social capital (items)
VARIABLES ever unemployed ever unemployed
More than one who helps in a crisis −0.0526∗∗∗ −0.0428∗∗
(0.018) (0.017)
Participation in Trade Unions −0.0727∗∗ −0.0629∗
(0.036) (0.036)
Participation in parents association −0.0759∗∗∗ −0.0804∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029)
Participation in sports club −0.0420∗∗ −0.0363∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Participation in professional organization −0.1129∗∗∗ −0.1097∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033)
Would remain in the neighbourhood −0.0455∗∗ −0.0664∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Similar to other in the neighbourhood −0.0264∗ −0.0356∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Black/British Caribbean 0.4314∗∗∗
(0.162)
Singles 0.1491∗∗∗
(0.02)
Temporary job 0.1589∗∗∗
(0.062)
Observations 3183 3184
R-squared 0.0425 0.0203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 if one has never experienced at least one
unemployment spell in the sample period and zero otherwise. This variable is calculated from
the “unemployment spells variable”. For details on dependent variable, control variables and
regressors (survey questions on social capital), refer to data appendix.
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